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NORTH KOREA NUKE HISTORY
North Korea maintains uranium mines with an estimated four million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium ore. Information on the state and quality of their mines is lacking, but it is estimated that the ore contains approximately 0.8% extractable uranium. In the mid-1960s, it established a large-scale atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon and trained specialists from students who had studied in the Soviet Union. Under the cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, a nuclear research center was constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From 1965 through 1973 fuel (fuel elements) enriched to 10 percent was supplied to the DPRK for this reactor.
In the 1970s it focused study on the nuclear fuel cycle including refining, conversion and fabrication. In 1974 Korean specialists independently modernized Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in the same way that other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched to 80 percent. Subsequently, the degree of fuel enrichment was reduced. In the same period the DPRK began to build a 5 MWe research reactor, what is called the ''second reactor.'' In 1977 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], allowing the latter to inspect a research reactor which was built with the assistance of the USSR.
The North Korean nuclear weapons program dates back to the 1980s. In the 1980s, focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system, North Korea began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion. It began construction of a 200 MWe nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities in Taechon and Yongbyon, respectively, and conducted high-explosive detonation tests. In 1985 US officials announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that a secret nuclear reactor was being built 90 km north of Pyongyang near the small town of Yongbyon. The installation at Yongbyon had been known for eight years from official IAEA reports. In 1985, under international pressure, Pyongyang acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the DPRK refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In July 1990 The Washington Post reported that new satellite photographs showed the presence in Yongbyon of a structure which could possibly be used to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel.
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Iran's Nuclear Threat
Iran's Nuclear Threat
In another worrying development for the Bush administration, Iran moves closer to operation of a facility to enrich uranium
International Atomic Energy Agency director Mohamed ElBaradei announced he had discovered that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium ?— a key component of advanced nuclear weapons ?— near Natanz. the plant is much further along than previously revealed. ''extremely advanced'' and involves ''hundreds'' of gas centrifuges ready to produce enriched uranium and ''the parts for a thousand others ready to be assembled.''
Iran announced last week that it intends to activate a uranium conversion facility near Isfahan, a step that produces the uranium hexafluoride gas used in the enrichment process. Iran actually introduced uranium hexafluoride gas into some centrifuges at an undisclosed location to test their ability to work. That would be a blatant violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory.
''If Iran were found to have an operating centrifuge, it would be a direct violation and is something that would need immediately to be referred to the United Nations Security Council for action,''
The new discoveries could destabilize a region already dangerously on edge in anticipation of war in Iraq. Israel ?— which destroyed an Iraqi nuclear plant in Osirak in a 1981 raid ?— is deeply alarmed by the developments.
''It's a huge concern,'' says one Israeli official. ''Iran is a regime that denies Israel's right to exist in any borders and is a principal sponsor of Hezbollah. If that regime were able to achieve a nuclear potential it would be extremely dangerous.'' Israel will not take the ''Osirak option'' off the table, the official says, but ''would prefer that this issue be solved in other ways.''
Critics of the Administration say Bush's hard public line against the so-called ''Axis of Evil,'' combined with the threatened war with Iraq, have acted as a spur to both Iran and North Korea to accelerate their nuclear programs. ''If those countries didn't have much incentive or motivation before, they certainly did after the Axis of Evil statement,'' says one western diplomat familiar with the Iranian and North Korean programs. The Administration counters that both programs have been underway for many years.
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November will be the point of no
The ?‘point of no return?’ is fast approaching
November will be the ''point of no return'' for taking out the Iranian nuclear program.
''Point of no return'' is a phrase with a history. In 1981, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin demanded to know when Saddam Hussein's nuclear plant at Osirak, Iraq, would reach it. Military intelligence then, as always, was muddy. Some of Begin's advisers counseled patience. Others warned that delay could be fatal. The most influential advocate of the go-for-it approach was Begin's minister of defense - Ariel Sharon.
Iran is now on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. This week, President Bush said categorically that he will not let that happen. But how will he stop it? Persuasion? The Iranians are spitting in the face of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Invasion? The U.S. military is already busy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Covert action? A botched operation would bring the wrath and scorn of the world down on the U.S.
Still, the ayatollahs are about to go atomic - and somebody has to stop them. That will be a dangerous and thankless job. Increasingly, it looks as if it will be outsourced to Israel.
The Bush administration already has supplied the tool kit, including the F-16I, the first Israeli war plane capable of striking Iran without in-flight refueling. The U.S. also has supplied ordnance capable of piercing massive fortifications.
''It is rather significant that the United States is now selling Israel over $300 million worth of bunker-busting bombs.
In 1981, Begin was forced to act without American approval. Prime Minister Sharon cannot afford to do that. It is a one-superpower world now, and U.S. support is absolutely critical to Israel. But Sharon will not be just a blind enforcer. He is, after all, the only guy around with experience in Islamic bomb-busting.
He also has the most to lose. If he takes out the Iranian nukes, it will further enrage the Muslim world. If he tries and fails, Israel's deterrent will be badly damaged. Either way, Iran very likely will attack Israel (and Jews around the world) with everything in its terrorist and conventional arsenal. Under the circumstances, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Sharon will demand - and get - a role in determining the what and the how of a future operation. And the when.
That's why it was so startling and instructive to hear Sharon's national security adviser say, in public, that the point of no return is now barely two months away.
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North Korean Missile Test
North Korean Missile Test
Australia views with deep concern North Korea's test of a medium-range ballistic missile on 31 August.
The action taken by North Korea to test a missile is a highly regrettable development. A North Korean medium-range ballistic missile capability, and the export of such missiles, complicates the security situation in North East Asia and elsewhere. It raises questions over North Korea's willingness to act as a responsible member of the broader international community.
In addition, we are concerned that the test was conducted without notification of closure areas to international shipping and aircraft.
Australia has worked actively to prevent the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. We are an active member of the Missile Technology Control Regime which seeks to prevent such proliferation by means of harmonised export licensing arrangements among the Regime's thirty-two member states.
The missile test has served to escalate tensions and set back the prospects for improving inter-Korean relations. The test is particularly unfortunate as it coincides with the ''sunshine'' policies of South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, aimed at increasing political, economic and people-to-people ties between North and South Korea. Those policies offer an excellent opportunity for making substantive progress on inter-Korean issues.
I strongly urge North Korea to respond positively to this opportunity. I would also urge North Korea to refrain from further provocative actions and from the export of missile equipment and technology
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