Frontload Democratic primaries
Terry McAuliffe didn't expect this. When McAuliffe, the Democratic National Committee chairman, decided to frontload the Democratic primaries, he was convinced that an early nominee would unify the party. He and his fellow Democrats were sure that hatred of President Bush was widespread and that any nominee with party backing ?– especially a nominee with appeal to swing voters ?– would be able to defeat the incumbent. If only the Democrats could grab an early nominee and keep him undefined until the Democratic National Convention, the White House would fall into Democratic hands.
The early primaries were a dangerous tactic. The early passion of primary voters meant that they defined the party. At first, that meant a strong Howard Dean candidacy. But then, the primary voters revealed their main agenda: getting George W. Bush out of office. It didn't matter who replaced him. And that is why Democrats chose John Kerry.
The Democrats who voted for John Kerry must be crying into their beers at this point. The slim lead he took away from the early primaries immediately dissipated, and the campaign became a dogfight, even as President Bush did little to defend his name or define his opponent.
. A Los Angeles Times poll in June 2004 showed that a full third of voters ''didn't know enough about Kerry to decide whether he would be a better president than Bush.'' The train was still running smoothly.
Kerry, who had avoided all attempts to categorize himself in any way, branded himself a Vietnam veteran candidate. He made his service in Vietnam the focal point of his White House run ?– and still, he could not pull away. He got virtually no bump from the convention.
And everyone remembered that, in wartime, all the misdirected vitriol in the world won't protect Americans from attack.
. Famous baseball star George Brett once stated that the first thing he looked for in the papers every Sunday was to see who was below the ''Mendoza line.'' He was referring to Mario Mendoza, an infielder with a career average of .215; if a player hit below that average, he was flat-out terrible. To score below Michael Dukakis as a presidential challenger is very much akin to breaking the Mendoza line ?– call it ''breaking the Dukakis line.''
So what went wrong for McAuliffe? After all, he got everything he wanted: an early nominee, a nominee with possible swing support, and a nominee who remained largely undefined until the convention. The McAuliffe strategy went south for two reasons: First, John Kerry is imperious and arrogant. Second, Kerry didn't have to define himself ?– his backers defined him.
And so when Kerry finally defined his candidacy at the convention, he had already been defined as a far-left candidate. Even his bloviation about Vietnam couldn't mask the radicalism of his supporters. That was the biggest problem with the McAuliffe strategy: The primary voters defined the party candidate.
By Democratic Committee chairman,
Terry McAuliffe didn't expect this. When McAuliffe, the Democratic National Committee chairman, decided to frontload the Democratic primaries, he was convinced that an early nominee would unify the party. He and his fellow Democrats were sure that hatred of President Bush was widespread and that any nominee with party backing ?– especially a nominee with appeal to swing voters ?– would be able to defeat the incumbent. If only the Democrats could grab an early nominee and keep him undefined until the Democratic National Convention, the White House would fall into Democratic hands.
The early primaries were a dangerous tactic. The early passion of primary voters meant that they defined the party. At first, that meant a strong Howard Dean candidacy. But then, the primary voters revealed their main agenda: getting George W. Bush out of office. It didn't matter who replaced him. And that is why Democrats chose John Kerry.
The Democrats who voted for John Kerry must be crying into their beers at this point. The slim lead he took away from the early primaries immediately dissipated, and the campaign became a dogfight, even as President Bush did little to defend his name or define his opponent.
. A Los Angeles Times poll in June 2004 showed that a full third of voters ''didn't know enough about Kerry to decide whether he would be a better president than Bush.'' The train was still running smoothly.
Kerry, who had avoided all attempts to categorize himself in any way, branded himself a Vietnam veteran candidate. He made his service in Vietnam the focal point of his White House run ?– and still, he could not pull away. He got virtually no bump from the convention.
And everyone remembered that, in wartime, all the misdirected vitriol in the world won't protect Americans from attack.
. Famous baseball star George Brett once stated that the first thing he looked for in the papers every Sunday was to see who was below the ''Mendoza line.'' He was referring to Mario Mendoza, an infielder with a career average of .215; if a player hit below that average, he was flat-out terrible. To score below Michael Dukakis as a presidential challenger is very much akin to breaking the Mendoza line ?– call it ''breaking the Dukakis line.''
So what went wrong for McAuliffe? After all, he got everything he wanted: an early nominee, a nominee with possible swing support, and a nominee who remained largely undefined until the convention. The McAuliffe strategy went south for two reasons: First, John Kerry is imperious and arrogant. Second, Kerry didn't have to define himself ?– his backers defined him.
And so when Kerry finally defined his candidacy at the convention, he had already been defined as a far-left candidate. Even his bloviation about Vietnam couldn't mask the radicalism of his supporters. That was the biggest problem with the McAuliffe strategy: The primary voters defined the party candidate.
By Democratic Committee chairman,